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Resumo
Os últimos três anos testemunharam alterações
de vulto nos assuntos internacionais. Os histo-
riadores olharão sem dúvida para trás conside-
rando que este ou aquele evento foi importante.
Para os decisores políticos, que têm de lidar
diariamente com estas preocupações num am-
biente em evolução constante, a tarefa é ainda
mais difícil.
Neste artigo o autor procura ilustrar uma visão
pessoal sobre como a NATO tem respondido a
estas alterações, como é que as percepções dos
aliados são frequentemente díspares em relação
às dos que se encontram fora da Aliança. Procu-
rará também comprovar como as mudanças
ocorridas no domínio militar e civil e os aconte-
cimentos do 11 de Setembro anunciaram uma
nova fase de mudança, a qual poderá incutir
alterações radicais na natureza da Aliança tal
como a conhecemos nos últimos 50 anos.
Esta é uma visão pessoal que não reflecte a
posição oficial do Governo Britânico. Baseia-se
antes em discussões com aqueles que se encon-
tram no cerne do debate político e na experiên-
cia pessoal como funcionário civil no mundo
diplomático e militar.
Abstract
The last three years have seen tectonic shifts in
International affairs. Historians will no doubt look
back and assert that clearly this or that event was the
defining moment. For policy makers who have to
grapple with day to day concerns in an increasingly
fast moving environment, the task is much more
difficult.
In this article I will try to set out one man’s view of
how NATO has responded to these changes, how the
perceptions of those within the Alliance are often at
odds with those outside, to show how circumstances
have forced change on both the military and civilian
arms and how the events of 11 September herald
another round of change which may radically change
the nature of the Alliance we have known over the
past 50 years.
This is very much a personal reflection and not an
official British Government view. It is based on
discussions with those at the heart of the policy
debate and on my own experiences as a serving
officer both in the diplomatic and military world.
* The views and opinions in this article are the author’s own and should not be taken as an expression of official policy.
I am particularly indebted to my former colleagues in NATO, SHAPE, the EU and WEU.
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Rethinking NATO
Introduction
Since the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Soviet Empire the future and need
for NATO has been questioned on a regular basis1. The Alliance has itself tried to answer
the question of its new role, most notably in the two Strategic Concept documents signed
by Heads of State and Government in 1991 and again in 1999. The very fact that there have
been two strategic Concept2 documents attests to the rapid changes in World society. The
profound nature of that change is illustrated by the fact that within less than a decade after
the fall of the Soviet empire three former Warsaw pact countries had been integrated into
the Alliance as full members.
Yet throughout that same decade many commentators and politicians continued to
question the need and relevance for NATO as the threat of a large-scale military invasion
from the East became less and less credible. A more critical observer might even ask
whether NATO was asking the right questions at all.
NATO was not alone amongst International Organisations in producing impressive
sounding communiqués setting out in some length and with high flown language their
new role and ambition. The CSCE3 became an organization. The European Community also
renamed itself as the European Union and in keeping with it’s more legalistic vocation
agreed the Treaty of Maastricht. The humble Western European Union was brought out of
hibernation and transferred to Brussels to be the EU’s “Operational arm” The western
security agenda seemed open to the highest bidder.
To a large extent this was a natural reaction to the dawning of a new era, an attempt
to codify uncertainty and thereby impose an order upon it. All through the early 1990s
various organisations took part in this war of communiqués. Perhaps the notable exception
was the United Nations. Some argued that the end of Cold War rivalry would at last allow
the UN to fulfil its vocation and assume responsibility for maintaining world peace.
Experience in real world crises was inconclusive and in many cases only served to
reinforce existing trends in the policy debate.
Western nations had already begun to cooperate outside the traditional institutional
framework in small scale Crisis Response Operations such as the European maritime
protection and mine clearance operation during the Iran/Iraq war. Placed under a WEU
flag, this appeared to lend credence to the idea of European only operations.
1 See for example “Why we will soon miss the Cold War” John Mearsheimer, The Atlantic Monthly August 1990.
2 NAC-S (99) 65-24 April.
3 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
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The Gulf War underlined the military might of America. The traditional supporters of
Airpower were given a boost by the advent and success of precision guided munitions. The
critics of NATO concluded that future operations would dispense with organisations
based on complex consensus building machinery. Coalitions of the willing were the way
forward.
By the same token European integrationists saw the need to redouble their efforts if the
new world order was not to be dominated by the sole remaining Superpower. NATO
supporters drew comfort form the fact that the coalition’s success was based in no small
part on 40 years experience of working and training together in the Alliance.
The Bosnia crisis at first seemed to show that despite the rhetoric, none of the existing
western security institutions were able to play a decisive role. Lasting damage was done
(at least in European and American minds) to the UN’s credibility as a major actor in crisis
management operations.
The Dayton Accords accurately reflected the trends of the period. Dominated and
driven by United States policy makers, the main pretenders to the International and
European Security Crown (UN, EU, OSCE and NATO) were all given a role in the
international effort to stabilise and resolve the crisis.
As the 1990’s drew to a close NATO seemed to have recovered its earlier standing.
NATO intervention in Bosnia had been decisive. IFOR4 and SFOR had been a major
success. A security dialogue with the former Warsaw Pact had been established based on
the Joint Founding Act, and the Euro Atlantic Partnership. Three former Warsaw Pact
members were on the point of joining as full NATO members. The challenge of a rival
European (only) Security and Defence Identity seemed to have diminished after the EU
Amsterdam Summit.
NATO prepared to celebrate 50 years of existence at its Washington Summit.
Unfortunately the march of history has no respect for dates imposed by mere mortals. As
the Alliance Heads of State and Government met in Washington, NATO was engaged in
the first offensive operation in its history. A campaign that was to test the organisation to
its limit, to prove both complex and politically painful, and to put a severe strain on
relations with Russia.
Eight months prior to the Washington Summit Britain and France had also re-launched
European Defence debate (now renamed ESDP) at the St Malo Summit. The Alliance was
forced to re-engage with the European Union to ensure that the abolition of the Western
4 Acronym for the NATO “Intervention Force” and later ” Stabilisation Force”.
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European Union and development of ESDP did not lead to a twin track Alliance with the
European allies pursuing a different course to the North Americans.
Nor did the fall of Milosevic put an end to problems in the Balkans. Over the following
two years NATO again found itself involved in new operations, in Southern Serbia and in
FYROM.
Then came the 11 September terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon, and the war in Afghanistan. Once again the pundits were vocal in questioning
the need and relevance of NATO in a world faced by the threat of asymmetric warfare and
rogue states5.
This year at the Prague Summit NATO leaders will need to answer those questions. The
aim of this article is to explore how an organisation designed to counter a single threat with
a necessarily bureaucratic approach has re-invented itself as one of the most successful
crisis management instruments in the world today. How this has been achieved and what
more needs to be done.
The extent to which NATO fulfils its vocation will naturally depend on the allies
recognising the changes that have taken place and agreeing the way forward. This will
require vision, courage and determination.
The Origin and reasons for Alliances
It is not the purpose of this article to summarise the wealth of literature on Alliance
theory, but is perhaps worth noting that it is an area of policy which, except in times of
national emergency, has often been contentious, with the detractors being almost as
numerous as the proponents – too costly, too constraining, too dangerous, unreliable,
unnecessary. The list of criticisms is long and the same arguments resurface again and
again. Scepticism about the future and relevance of NATO is nothing new.
Alliances can be traced back to antiquity, but their heyday was probably the period of
the so called “classical” modern state system, which has been used to describe the period
from the mid seventeenth century to the First World War, when the average figure was
almost one alliance established per year6. It is worth noting that for much of the early part
5 See for example “The Cold War is over, but NATO is still stuck in its ways” Mathew Kaminski, Wall St
Journal Oct 5 2001.” All dressed up and Nowhere to go” Frederick Kempe Wall St Journal 2 Oct 2001.
6 For a more detailed analysis of alliance theories See Ken Boyle “Alliances, Contemporary Strategy, Theories
and Policies” Croom Helm, 1975 ISBN 0-85664-168-5.
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of this period the acquisition of territory by force of arms was an accepted practice under
international law.
In the 20th century alliances have had a mixed record. Blamed on the one hand with
being part of the process that led to the First World War and on the other singularly failing
to deter the advance of fascism in Europe in the late 1930s. It is hardly surprising therefore
that the United States, particularly the US Congress was reluctant to enter into new
Alliances in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.
Alyson Bailes, currently director of SIPRI7, has argued8 that the creation of the
Western European Union (WEU) played a crucial role in persuading the United States
that western European nations were prepared to make the necessary commitment to
collective self defence and as such played an important role as a catalyst for the
development of NATO.
It can be argued that the much maligned WEU has played a similar role during the
period from 1993 to 2001, in both the development the European Security and Defence
architecture and in influencing thinking and procedures in the Alliance as NATO
transformed itself from essentially a military alliance to an organisation capable of playing
a decisive role in crisis management.
That it was felt necessary to resurrect the WEU in this way tells us much about the
tensions among the allies within NATO, in particular over changes to it’s key tasks and also
over the role that Europe could and should play in transatlantic security.
Alliances can be seen from a variety of perspectives and modern academic thinkers in
the field of International relations have introduced some highly conceptual and philosophical
elements.
Traditionally alliances have been thought of as arising out of nation states concern to
maintain international or local stability via a balance of power. This can be because states
want to increase their own ability to deter an attack or alternatively to exercise a restraining
influence over a much larger partner by binding it into a formal alliance. NATO allies of
the Cold war period certainly manifested both aspects.
NATO in the Cold War also established fairly clearly the lines between the Communist
dominated and the “Free” Europe. The reasons why nations such as Sweden Finland and
Switzerland did not join NATO were sometimes explained by the “Coalition” theorists
namely that alliances tend to accrue new members until the participants are sure of
7 SIPRI – The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
8 “Defence Analysis” December 1999, Volume 15, Number 3.
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winning and no further, or the “Affiliation” theorists who point to ideological factors or
still others who focus on other domestic factors to determine alliance proneness. Elements
of this thinking still echo throughout the current debate on NATO’s future role.
In his controversial articles entitled “The End of History”9 Francis Fukuyama also
explored themes that strike a chord with many practioners in the world of Politico Military
affairs post 1989. In particular he highlighted the decline of ideology with the corresponding
emergence of new national leaders whose policies are more overtly pragmatic than those
based on a preconceived world vision.
In his analysis of the individual’s need for recognition and respect from “the group”
there is an immediate and self evident read across to why NATO membership continues
to be a prime foreign policy objective for a number of European nations. Fukuyama also
described the emergence of Muslim fundamentalism, or more accurately radicalism, as a
response to states’ failure to address the aspirations of their people in a world dominated
by liberal democratic values.
I have only briefly sketched over these themes as a backdrop to the current debate.
However for the outside observer the difficulty with much of the academic analysis is that
it can only hope to identify trends. Important though these are, in an alliance of nineteen
members not all would accept or indeed recognise the validity of such trends. By the same
token, the new pragmatism described by Fukuyama has often been a source of tension
within an alliance where many decision makers and opinion formers spent the formative
years of their careers during the certainties of the Cold War.
NATO and the Use of Force
Most analysts would agree that the crises and security challenges in the modern era are
increasingly complex and multi facetted. Rogue states by definition do not comply with
international standards of behaviour. States, which are threatened by internal threat, are
often unable to exert control over extremist groups and the descent into civil war is
notoriously bloody and vicious.
Fundamental to understanding the use of force in the modern era is the issue of
escalation. Force is the ultimate deterrent, but the use of force is a cumulative process not
9 The End of History and the Last Man” Francis Fukyama, Hamish Hamilton ISBN 014010134557.
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an absolute. A show of force (the raised fist) may be sufficient to win an argument, but once
force is applied and the first blow struck, the initiator must be ready to follow through with
if necessary increasing levels of force10.
NATO’s value, both during the Cold war and in the modern era lies in its ability to
escalate pressure through a range of levels, if necessary (however unlikely) to that of the
nuclear strike. NATO was to paraphrase Roosevelt the “Big Stick” which allowed the
International community, and particularly the European nations, to “talk softly”.
NATO’s task during the cold war was largely one of deterrence. In the modern era the
task is more likely to be one of compliance; both in the strict sense of ensuring that warring
parties comply with the terms of peace settlements (e.g. the Dayton accords in Bosnia) and
in the wider context (as in Kosovo) that states comply with internationally accepted norms
of behaviour.
In the main, the NATO allies no longer have to deal with the risk that invading forces
will overrun their territory. The new risks are mostly concerned with the threat to the
world economic and political order and to regional stability.
The activities of Rogue states, outbreaks of civil war, the internal collapse of regional
powers, neighbours or trading partners may have a significant impact on NATO allies.
Terrorist outrages are horrifying, but none of these threats are likely to lead to the
overthrow of allied governments and the subjugation of the entire population to an outside
power, which for the allies was the singular menace of the Cold War.
The task of maintaining the Status quo in the Nuclear Age was quite different to that
of the modern era. Massive Assured Destruction and Flexible Response were, whatever
one’s moral position, perfectly sound intellectual and military responses to the threat of
invasion by a large well organised and resourced opponent such as the Former Soviet Union.
During the Cold war NATO, its structures and the conventional forces of the allies
were not designed to defeat the Warsaw Pact on the plains of central Europe, but to act as
part of an escalation, or trigger process which if activated brought the risk nuclear
Armageddon.
The Cold War NATO provided a mechanism that would allow the allies to be locked
into the global balance of nuclear power. Although administratively and procedurally
quite complex the conceptual approach underpinning the design of NATO’s Cold War
decision making architecture was relatively straightforward.
10 See also Richard J Barnet “Reflections on the Use of Force” and Professor Robert O’Neill “ The Use of
Military Force: Constants Factors and new Trends.
John S. Duncan
73 NAÇÃODEFESA
Consensus was needed, not on the threat itself, but on the means to meet the threat (the
Plan) and on the day, that the threat itself (i.e. invasion) had indeed materialised. NATO’s
extensive planning architecture devoted 40 years to developing scenarios and ways to meet
this one massive challenge of a Soviet invasion. NATO’s decision making structures were
designed to achieve and support a consensus on the plan.
NATO allies had already largely given Consent that their national Armed forces
should be developed and deployed to meet the objectives of the NATO plan. Once the
threat materialised then Consent to use the forces would be transferred to NATO’s
Strategic Commanders (SACEUR and SACLANT).
The Nuclear Balance of Terror in the Cold War also introduced a distortion to Von
Clauswitz famous dictum about war “being the continuation of politics by other means”;
the idea in many capitals that somehow there existed a dividing line between Diplomacy
and the use of military force.
The aim of the balance of terror is to achieve a “Mexican stand off” but to avoid
reaching the point where the gun is pulled from the holster, since the scope for discussion
beyond that point so severely constrained as to be almost suicidal to the party which
attempts it. In essence the role of Diplomats becomes to prevent war, while that of the
military to pursue it once diplomacy has “failed”.
This view on the supposed dividing line between Military and Diplomatic actors is at
odds with pre cold war historical experience, but it is still widespread. Elements of the
argument can be found in the US government’s EuroStrategy 2000 “Strengthening
Transatlantic Security – A Strategy for the 21st Century” published under the Clinton
presidency.
Unfortunately these ideas have all too often also been reflected in the design of national
decision making structures. Thus greatly complicating the task of adapting Alliance
structures.
For those nations who still face a real risk of territorial aggression by their neighbours,
the issue of whether NATO remains principally a collective defence organisation is one of
practical self-interest. They naturally do not wish to see any refocusing and possible
weakening in NATO’s military preparedness. For others for whom NATO represents the
physical manifestation of US world dominance, constraining NATO’s development beyond
collective self-defence may allow other international organisations to develop, where the
US is not such a dominant force.
The development of the European Union’s ESDP can be seen as one such organisation,
but it is also a recognition that modern crisis management requires a holistic response
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which allows both civil and military capabilities to be used together, i.e. in a quite different
way to the Cold War balance of terror.
The still widespread view that NATO should remain essentially a military alliance and
should only deal with the use of force has had profound implications for NATO’s ability
to adapt its structures to meet the challenges of the modern era.
NATO has been reluctant to build links with other crisis management organisations.
Despite a high degree of practical cooperation with civilian agencies in its Balkan operations,
until relatively recently NATO’s concept of Civil Military Cooperation (CMIC) was still
largely based on an old model which aimed to solve the problem of how to keep civilians
away from the battlefield and how to prevent an exodus of civilian refugees from clogging
up the main military supply lines.
The supposed distinction between the Political/diplomatic aspects and the military
aspects of crisis management has meant that this divide is largely maintained within
NATO’s internal structures in a way that risks duplication of effort and delays in
decision-making.
Force Structures
In the early 1990’s NATO began to redesign its Force and Command Structure to meet
the challenges of the Post Cold War era. One striking change was the reduction in US
dominance at the top of the NATO Command Structure with the decision to cut the post
of the American Deputy SACEUR11, and the corresponding increase in responsibility and
role of the European DSACEUR. The process of change is still ongoing as NATO applies
the lessons of its operations in the Balkans (which has also had the effect of increasing the
European role in the Alliance’s military structures).
The dominant political and economic driver of the period was the desire to capitalise
on the supposed “peace dividend”. However as with any major structural reform, NATO’s
military adaptation has been a slow process where vested interests and bureaucratic inertia
resistance to change tried and tested ways of working have acted as a major brake on
progress. The same can be said for the reform process of NATO’s civil arm (see below).
The existence of an integrated multinational command structure has long been seen as
one of NATO’s major strengths. For the military, 50 years of working and training together
11 Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
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in a multinational environment has built up an unparalleled degree of trust and experience.
At a purely practical level the NATO command structure also provides a career path for
the military that might not otherwise exist.
Although the larger powers have often retained national military procedures, the
NATO “way” laid the bedrock and provided the confidence to act in coalitions outside the
NATO framework.
For politicians the integrated command structure was originally a method to ensure
that all the allies shared the same risk and were “locked into” the decision making process.
In the post Cold war era the logic has to some extent been reversed with the integrated
military structure becoming the mechanism that allows every NATO ally to be a stakeholder
in any military operation.
One cannot ignore the fact that the NATO command structure, with its numerous
headquarters and facilities was also important in both economic and social terms. More
than one NATO Headquarters is located in a previously economically deprived area.
Thus while nations individually implemented major cutbacks, withdrawing from
bases abroad, closing bases at home and cutting back the readiness of their Armed Forces,
there have always been strong arguments and pressures working against radical change at
multinational level.
As a result the first round of restructuring completed in 1999 left in place an architecture
still better suited to the Cold War task of territorial defence. This was particularly true for
the Joint Sub Regional Headquarters (JSRCs), which were specifically designed and
intended as a static non-deployable asset.
This was not the outcome sought by the NATO military themselves who were
increasingly to recognise that future operations (even for Article 5) were likely to be of an
expeditionary nature. The experience of crisis management operations in the Balkans since
1995 has only served to reinforced the NATO military in this view.
Work on the major deployable multinational headquarters structure, The Combined Joint
Task Force Headquarters (CJTF) has been underway for nearly a decade. The advocates of
this project argue that it will provide a key capability both for European only operations and
for NATO operations beyond the Alliance’s traditional theatre of operations, for example the
possible Humanitarian support operation which was at one time mooted for Afghanistan.
Only time will tell whether the CJTF concept proves to be the type of capability NATO
and the EU require. There are equally strong arguments for supposing that this level of
command will only be required for high intensity operations close to if not actual war
fighting.
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In real world crisis management operations in the Balkans, NATO has made use of a
lighter Force structure based around its high readiness Headquarters, The Allied Command
Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force
Land (AMFL). NATO is currently developing the capability to deploy more such units
including the Eurocorps.
The military command structure being established for the ESDP also uses a lighter
force structure. The NATO experience in real world crisis management operations suggests
that the Strategic level Commander plays a more crucial role than currently allowed for in
the ESDP architecture. This is particularly the case in the early stages of an operation.
Nations value having a trusted senior commander to whom they can have instant access.
Giving this role to the commander in the field as implied under the ESDP arrangements
risks placing an unacceptable burden on the officer who already has a major task in
managing a complex multinational operation in a difficult environment.
It is striking that when the Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo were at their most intense,
the middle level NATO Headquarters, in both cases AFSOUTH based in Naples, was not
what the outside observer might expect. AFSOUTH has always played a key role for Air
operations, but for ground operations the driving force was very much the relationship
between NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) who was in direct contact with
capitals and the theatre commander on the ground.
It was only when the operations had stabilised that AFSOUTH was given what would
normally be considered its traditional role. This may offer some lessons for the development
of a suitable command structure for “European only” operations under EU auspices and
indicate how NATO’s command structure could develop in future. NATO’s experience has
underlined the importance the nations attach to having a permanent strategic level
commander (in particular SACEUR) to whom they can turn in times of crisis. The ESDP
architecture currently has no equivalent post; although the possibility of developing the
role of the Deputy SACEUR (the senior European commander in the NATO military
structure) to fulfil this need has been discussed.
NATO’s Political and Diplomatic role
The task of adapting NATO’s Political /Diplomatic structures has also been a major
challenge and the area where arguably most work remains to be done if NATO is to meet
its full potential.
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Both the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts agreed to develop NATO’s area of policy
responsibility to develop the organisation towards a Politico Military forum; expanding
the NATO remit to place more emphasis on “Security “ matters rather than just a collective
defence alliance12.
Some would argue that in any case the United States has never needed NATO for self
defence; that it was the military and industrial might of America and particularly President
Reagan’s SDI which eventually bankrupted the Former Soviet Union and brought about its
demise. It can be argued that contribution to NATO was the price Europe paid to ensure
US protection.
If one considers that Defence is about protecting the metaphorical “castle walls” and
Security is about forging alliances with neighbours (often by marriage if one continues the
medieval analogy) in order to keep the enemy even further away from the castle, then Cold
War NATO was indeed much more a security organisation for the United States.
This premise gives rise to the key issues that NATO must tackle if it is to remain a
viable force in the politics of the 21st century. If in contrast to the US, for the majority of
European Allies NATO has largely been and for some still is, predominantly an organisation
concerned with Defence will they be prepared to adapt the organisations structures and
modus operandi to effectively bridge the gap between security and defence.
The principal actors in this process of adaptation and change are the Secretary General
his staff and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The extent to which these bodies are able
to adapt to the new challenges will be the benchmark for determining whether NATO has
a future.
The Alliance has been remarkably fortunate in the calibre of the three men who have
occupied the post of Secretary General since the end of the Cold War; the late Manfred
Woerner, Javier Solana, and currently Lord Robertson of Port Ellen. Three very different
individuals who brought quite different strengths to the post, but who have all taken the
new agenda forward and developed the role of the Secretary General.
It is often suggested that in today’s world of instant communication, jet travel,
videoconference links, etc. the role of ambassadors and diplomats has been marginalized.
Senior politicians and decision makers can deal directly with each other. The Internet, and
12 In paragraph 20 of the 1991 Strategic Concept document the allies sought to link this new role back to Article
4 of the original North Atlantic (Washington) Treaty, and to establish “The Alliance as a transatlantic forum
for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments
posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common
concern”.
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24-hour news coverage means that senior politicians have to be ready to react in much
shorter timescales.
Technological advances have certainly brought great change to the world of diplomacy
and high-level decision-making they have not changed the fundamentals of negotiation or
consensus building.
High-level shuttle diplomacy (be it physical or virtual) has its place but successful
negotiation, as in the commercial world depends on effective delegation to intermediaries
who can, develop the outlines of agreement, test and flesh out differences, dividing real
obstacles from misunderstanding and prepare the ground for an eventual accord.
Although most large bureaucratic institutions encounter considerable internal resistance
to change, for NATO the task of adapting has been made more complex, as mentioned in
the preceding sections, by profound differences of view in several allied Capitals about the
desirability of such changes in the nature and functioning of the Alliance. Some considered
that other organisations notably the European Union or the OSCE were better suited to
deal with security matters13.
The NATO International Staff structure underwent an initial re-organisation in the
early 1990’s, but it has essentially remained much the same as during the Cold War. One
potentially significant development was the creation of the Balkans Task Force to cover
NATO’s intervention and supporting role in Bosnia. (See below on how this has worked
in practice).
Although NATO has a well developed committee structure The North Atlantic Council
remains by far in a way the most important actor, jealous of its power and privilege and
the only body capable of driving forward such fundamental change.
The North Atlantic Council like so many high level committees has its own dynamic,
a combination of the personalities of the Ambassadors who make up its membership and
its own peculiar ethos.
There is little to be gained by dwelling on the former, other than to make two remarks.
Firstly that an organisational structure that is too “personality dependent” may like the
proverbial Statue with feet of clay, not be sustainable in the longer term. Secondly
to underline the importance of the Ambassador/mission being linked to the capital’s
decision making “inner sanctum”. Generally speaking this is so, but given the speed of
13 See Senator Roth’s comments in Congressional Record N.º 12 Vol. 138 on proceedings of the 102nd Congress,
Second Session.
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modern communications and the pressure for instant response, it becomes crucially
important.
This brings us to a problem peculiar to NATO Ambassadors in that they are representing
at the same time and often on the same issue at least two if not three arms of government
– the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Head of government/state.
In the WEU experiment it was decided that Ambassadors should sit alongside their
military counterparts so that WEU Council meetings would be truly Politico/Military.
Some nations were uncomfortable with this arrangement for historic reasons, but the
advantages in terms of rapid decision-making were self-evident. This arrangement was
replicated throughout the WEU structure.
Largely in response the WEU initiative and in order that the two organisations could
meet together below the level of the Council, NATO created a Politico/military committee
in the form of the Policy Coordination Group (PCG). However elsewhere the NATO
committee structure remains essentially divided into military and civilian bodies. As
discussed above there is a strong element of Cold war thinking in this reluctance to see
crisis management as very much a joint process.
It is perhaps illustrative in this context to look at the terms of reference agreed for the
European Union’s Political Security Committee14 which has been set up to oversee the EU
Security and Defence Policy.
It can be argued that in establishing this body the European allies were attempting to
establish a template for how the NAC might work in future. The key phrase in this text is
that the PSC will exercise the “political control and strategic direction” of a military
crisis-management operation.
If this means that the Council and the PSC will set the political parameters for the
operation then this is helpful guidance. If on the other hand the Council/PSC assumes that
their task is one of day-to-day control then we are wandering dangerously close to
micromanagement.
Modern crisis management is far too complex to be run by committee. The task of such
bodies is to provide consensus for action and to delegate authority to others to implement
that decision.
14 Annex III of Annex VI of the EU Presidency Report to the Nice Council.
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Recent NATO Balkan experience as a model for the future
Despite the experience of operations in Bosnia where NATO (albeit in the form of IFOR
and subsequently SFOR) had to work closely with a wide variety of international
organisations on a daily basis, NATO did not establish a framework at Brussels level to
deal with other International Organisations on a regular basis.
Little attempt was made to develop an executive diplomatic arm that could establish
such links; nor was it foreseen that in an emerging real world crisis NATO might require
to deploy representatives to the region to act as the organisation’s eyes and ears on the
ground.
In the run up to and during the Kosovo crisis the lack of a diplomatic arm became a
quite serious problem, particularly after NATO deployed troops to The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to support the OSCE sponsored Kosovo Verification
Mission (KVM) in late 1998.
The FYROM authorities were naturally concerned that assisting the International
Community in this way might provoke an aggressive reaction from President Milosevic,
to which they were well placed to respond.
Although NATO did appoint a “Special Envoy”, the former German Ambassador Eiff,
an experienced diplomat who had the trust of the local authorities, his appointment and
the lack of practical support for his role was symptomatic of the ad hoc “one man show”
approach which dominated NATO thinking.
As General Wesley Clark vividly describes in his book on the period “Waging Modern
War”15 senior NATO military commanders both at strategic level and on the ground were
increasingly asked to carry out a quasi-diplomatic role.
When NATO anti-radar missiles inadvertently landed in Bulgaria during the Air
Campaign it was the NATO military commanders who visited Sofia, appearing on national
television to explain and reassure this vital ally.
This situation continued to the end of the Kosovo crisis when the key “peace”
documents the Military Technical Agreement with the FRY and the Undertaking to
Demilitarise with the Kosovar guerrillas, were again essentially drafted by NATO’s
military arm and negotiated by the commanders on the ground.
15 “Waging Modern War” General Wesley Clark, Publicaffairs Ltd, 2001 ISBN 1903985080.
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Two years later Ethnic Albanian guerrillas in the Presevo valley of Southern Serbia
began an insurrection that subsequently spread over the border into neighbouring FYROM.
Since the vast majority of KFOR’s logistical support transited this area, NATO had reason
to be concerned. Once again NATO’s early effort to defuse the emerging crisis was led by
the NATO military commanders on the ground and their civilian staff.
However in the intervening period the European Union had been strengthening its
own crisis response capability via the development of the European Security and Defence
Policy. It had deployed a small unit of its unarmed monitors, the ECMM into the region
and more importantly had begun to develop a political and economic partnership with
FYROM with the signature of a Security and Stabilisation Agreement.
Thus both NATO and The European Union had a stake in the stability of FYROM.
Under the leadership of the EU Secretary General, (former NATO Secretary General)
Dr. Javier Solana, the EU began to play a greater role, working alongside Lord Robertson
and NATO, in resolving the crisis.
In many ways this was a significant change in the role usually played by a NATO
Secretary General. Although it would be a simplification to suggest that hitherto the NATO
Secretary general’s role was limited to chairing the Council and supervising the International
staff, it is true to say that, in contrast to his counterparts at the UN and the EU, The NATO
Secretary General had not previously been given such autonomy to act and negotiate on
behalf of the organisation16.
Both NATO and the EU had the considerable advantage, in contrast to the OSCE, (or
by the same token the UN) of possessing readily deployable assets, in terms of men and
equipment, to support on the ground the efforts of the two senior level negotiators.
Gradually the NATO civilian machine in Brussels began to become more involved and
a team led by the head of the Balkans Task Force, Peter Feith was deployed to the region.
The BTF had rarely if ever been used in this way before and its deployment not only
provided a day to day back up and reinforcement to the work of the Secretary General, but
also greatly improved the ability of the Council to monitor events and provide strategic
level political guidance.
The subsequent signature of agreements between political representatives of the
various ethnic groups brokered by the NATO and EU negotiators paved the way for NATO
16 This process of accruing power to the post of Secretary General can be traced back to the role played by
Dr Solana during the Kosovo air campaign, when the Council delegated considerable powers to the
Secretary General and the SACEUR over the selection of targets. See “Waging Modern War; ibid.
Rethinking NATO
82NAÇÃODEFESA
to undertake Operation Harvest under which the Albanian guerrillas formally surrendered
their weapons.
In the next phase the lead role on the ground would pass to the European Union and
OSCE monitors, but in a repeat of the NATO Extraction Force for the Kosovo Monitoring
Mission (KVM) mentioned above, NATO troops would provide a small military force17 to
ensure that unarmed monitoring teams could be extricated should they find themselves at
risk or taken hostage.
At the time of writing discussions are under way for the European Union to take over
the “extraction” role from NATO using the new architecture established under the ESDP.
Indeed there were some who argued in the early stages of the crisis that there was no need
for NATO to take on the military role, that the EU was ready to assume this responsibility.
There are several reasons why this view could well be mistaken. Firstly the institutions
of the ESDP are relatively new and untested. Politicians must have confidence in an
organisation if they are to entrust the lives of their young men and women (and by
extension their own political careers) to operations that will put them in harms way. NATO
has earned that trust over 50 years of its existence and 7 years of testing crisis management
in the Balkans.
Moreover NATO has, as discussed above, the ability to escalate the use of force and it
has demonstrated the willingness to do so. The EU is an unknown quantity. Its ability and
willingness to escalate the use of force unproven. The risk that warring parties might
miscalculate the EU’s resolve had to be a factor in deciding to use NATO.
Twelve months later the events in FYROM have served to erode much of the institutional
rivalry between NATO and the EU. A healthy dose of real world practical experience has
been injected into an ESDP debate, which risked becoming overly centred on institutional
theology. The role of the Strategic commander (as exemplified by the post of SACEUR and
DSACEUR in NATO) is better understood. In sum the prospect for a successful transition
to the first operation under the ESDP are more auspicious.
However the ability to escalate, the trust and confidence it evokes means that NATO
is likely to remain the organisation of choice for the more challenging crisis management
operations and almost certainly if the United States wishes to play a major role. If NATO
can also apply the lessons for the development of NATO’s diplomatic and civil arm this can
only serve to increase the organisations effectiveness.
17 Task Force Amber Fox.
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New Strategic Partnership with Russia
At the time of writing the relationship between Russia and the Alliance stands on the
brink of major evolution. The main catalyst for this were the events of 11 September when
at least some in the Russian leadership recognised that there might be positive benefit in
working with NATO (see below).
The decline from Empire is almost invariably a painful process, as the former western
colonial powers, Britain, France and Portugal ought to recognise only too well. It should
therefore come as no surprise that NATO has found developing a balanced relationship
with Russia both challenging and problematic. Moreover, if the end of Cold War certainties
has posed major intellectual and conceptual challenges for Western decision makers and
opinion formers, then for Russia the process of coming to grips with the new era is
arguably even more difficult and painful.
In the eyes of many Russians, particularly the political elite, NATO is an obstacle to
Russian involvement in Europe. The 1999 Kosovo conflict, in particular the air campaign,
only served to reinforce Russian fears about the Alliance and their own vulnerability.
Unable to have any decisive influence over NATO’s campaign, Russia was forced to fall
back on dangerous and theatrical gestures such as their independent “dash for Pristina”
ahead of the main KFOR deployment in June 1999 in an effort to show that Russia remained
a force to be reckoned with.
Paradoxically despite their very different perceptions, Russia has had a clear plan and
agenda for its relations with NATO: to establish a role equal to other allies, i.e. joint
decision-making/or a veto and some would say to weaken the influence of the Alliance.
By contrast, despite the Founding Act, NATO has struggled to develop an overall
concept, objective or game plan for its relationship with Russia.
Lord Robertson regularly called for a bolder approach with Moscow. Unfortunately
NATO has had few ”carrots” to offer. Indeed until recently attempting a pro-active
engagement on issues to stimulate reform could have soured the relationship further.
Despite generally good cooperation on the ground between Russian and NATO forces in
Bosnia and Kosovo, officials within Russia’s Politico/ Military structure (the Alliance’s
natural interlocutors) have been reluctant to engage. The one area where NATO could
provide real assistance is in military reform but quite naturally this is a highly sensitive,
if not embarrassing issue for them given the parlous state of the Russian military machine.
By comparison the European Union, under the Russian Common Strategy is well
placed to offer incentives to reform. The EU offers a high level economic dialogue focusing
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on WTO accession and institutional reform, underpinned by EU funding and a parallel
political dialogue on ESDP. These are all things Russia wants.
The EU focus is on consolidating the rule of law, the administration, social and health
sector reform, support for civil society coupled with police and judicial co-operation, in
tackling organised crime. The underlying conceptual approach is to minimise the impact
on western European economies and society by encouraging reforms that will provide
Russia with a “soft landing” as it declines from its super power status.
NATO shares that objective, but needs to move from an incremental policy and to be
firm in resisting Russian attempts at wedge driving. This argues for establishing a practical
framework agenda that describes what NATO wants to achieve in its relationship with
Russia, including both long and medium term objectives.
President Putin’s announcements following the events of 11 September offered the
possibility of a radical new approach. The NATO/Russia Summit in Rome this year offers
a major opportunity to establish a new relationship.
NATO Allies share a common threat and one where there is an evident advantage in
pooling Russian and Allied expertise in combating that threat. Time will tell whether the
NATO allies collectively can rise to this challenge, whether the new NATO/Russia Council
will prove to be the mechanism within which formal cooperation can develop, and more
importantly whether Russia below the level of the Presidency is willing to follow President
Putin’s lead without seizing the opportunity to pursue old agendas.
Outreach, Partnership for Peace and Enlargement
The Outreach programme and its military expression, Partnership for Peace (PfP) has
been one of the Alliance great success stories. What began as a largely political process now
has a very real military underpinning. It is perhaps the area that demonstrates best the
Alliance’s ability to adapt its procedures and objectives and rise to new challenges.
Whether the outreach programme should lead to eventual NATO enlargement remains
a contentious issue. Those who seek to preserve the simplicity of the old architecture argue
that allowing in new members risks complicating the decision-making structures. They
point to the experience of the Western European Union or the OSCE to argue that an
Alliance of 20-30 members will be unworkable, that the impact on NATO’s Integrated
military structure would undermine NATO’s ability to conduct operations, that the
Alliance would not be able to meet its fundamental collective defence commitments.
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Against this argument are those who have argued, notably in North America for the “ Big
Bang”. Allow all the aspirant nations into the alliance.
Experience may suggest that advocates of the “Big bang” may be closer to what NATO
needs, but there are other models that imply a major reorganisation of the way NATO does
business. Bearing in mind that any decision to enlarge the Alliance is above all a political
decision, it is worth looking at how the outreach programme has developed and changed
over time in coming to a view on the best model for the future.
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War the allies needed to establish a political
dialogue with central and eastern European states, a mechanism which would publicly
demonstrate that these countries were now part of the “Free World”, and to assist with
military reconversion and to ensure that Communist dictatorship was not replaced by a
military one.
Although in the early 1990s NATO was still predominantly a military alliance, the
Strategic concept had set out an ambitious new Agenda. The development of the Outreach
programme is arguably the one area where the Alliance has lived up to its ambitions.
Most former Warsaw pact nations very much shared NATO’s objectives. NATO was
seen as an effective institution, driven by the US. Membership involved accepting clear
achievable standards, but the hurdle was not as great as the major economic and legislative
reforms required for European Union membership.
The first steps along the path in the form of participation in the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC) allowed those outside the Alliance to demonstrate that they
were now part of the NATO architecture. At the same time the NACC ensured that
NATO’s decision-making structure, in particular its military structure was preserved.
NACC provided an extremely useful testing ground and a forum where former
enemies could begin to work together to learn about and from each other. However
political discussion in the NACC soon began to lack substance and there was pressure,
both inside the Alliance and amongst the Partner countries for at least some Partners to be
made full Allies.
NATO’s parallel military cooperation was also established in 1994 under the Partnership
for Peace (PfP) programme. It began as an attempt to help non-NATO countries to
reconfigure their Armed forces, both to ensure that they remained under civilian control
and to assist them via the Partnership Planning and Review Programme (PARP) to become
interoperable with NATO forces in possible Non Article 5 operations.
This latter aim took on real significance with NATO’s decision to deploy ground forces
to Bosnia in 1995. The counter argument against those who suggest that enlargement
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would damage NATO’s ability to conduct operations is the real world example of 7 years
experience of running very successful operations in the Balkans in cooperation with more
than 30 other nations.
In 1997 NATO decided to admit Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary as new
members and confirmed its “Open Door” policy to admitting additional countries. In
parallel the NACC was reinforced in a new format of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC).
Enlargement has been considered in classic terms. New members gaining positions in
the NATO military and civilian hierarchy. But the line between ally and non-ally is
becoming blurred in important areas.
NATO’s article 5 Defence Guarantee is not an automatic call to arms. The relevant
wording is ”The Parties agree that … if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, … will
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking …. such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force”18.
This builds on the lesser-known Article 4 which states that:
“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the
territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened”.
Nations participating in Partnership for Peace have also gained the right to request
formal consultations with NATO if they consider themselves under threat19. This right has
indeed been invoked, most notably by Albania and the FYROM during the Kosovo conflict.
The subsequent commitments given by the NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, to those
two countries governments, while not formally “Security Guarantees” came very close to
an ad hoc and time delimited version of Article 5.
In parallel Non-NATO nations have and continue to work with NATO in real world
crisis management operations. In early operations in Bosnia the non-allies had effectively
18 Article 5: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack
occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”.
19 Partnership for Peace Invitation Document issued by the Heads of State and government participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10 January 1994. Paragraph 3 “NATO will consult with any
active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its t territorial integrity,
political independence, or security”.
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no say in how these operations were set up (planned) or conducted. Nor did they gain
significant command positions in NATO’s operational command structure.
While at present there seems little prospect that we will see generals from Partner
nations commanding NATO operations (the number of personnel and equipment they are
currently able to contribute would not justify senior command positions), the 1997 EAPC
Basic Document sought to increase Partners decision-making opportunities “to the maximum
extent possible (and) relating to activities in which they (partners) participate”.
This process has continued under the “Enhanced Politico Military Framework” under
which Partner nations participating in NATO operations are given the opportunity to
comment on draft operational planning before it comes to the NATO Council and well
before their involvement via the EAPC. This is a significant new development allowing
non-allies real influence at an early stage in the decision making process. Formally NATO
allies retain the final decision making power and the only sanction non-allies have is to
refuse to participate or to withdraw from an operation. However, NATO has already
moved a long way down the road to the type of “variable geometry”, which was tried in
the Western European Union.
The process underway in NATO to involve non-allies is in stark contrast to that
being developed in the EU for the involvement of non-members in the European Security
and Defence Policy. The Documents agreed at the EU Nice Summit in 200020 offer
consultation opportunities in a model that harks back to the NACC and the arrangements
set up for Partner involvement in NATO’s original IFOR operation. Although pressure
from NATO allies has led to a more flexible interpretation of the Nice texts there are
good reasons for supposing that the EU will be unable to go much further at least in the
short term.
The EU institutions that deal with Security/Defence policy also deal with the Common
Foreign Policy. So there are real practical difficulties over the participation by non-members
in ESDP discussion in the EU. So far the EU Member States have not found a way to involve
non-members to discussions on ESDP while excluding them from discussion on Foreign
Policy issues.
There is also the issue of the way that the EU places greater emphasis on legal issues.
The EU ethos and experience is very different to that of NATO, which has developed
a generally pragmatic approach, through which political level decision by the NATO
Council is generally sufficient to implement even far-reaching changes.
20 Annex VI to Annex VI of the EU Presidency Report to the Nice Summit.
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Although both the EU and NATO are based on International Treaties, the EU has
developed a large amount of legal case law (the EU Acquis) and tends to operate in what
to the outside observer might seem a rather legalistic manner where a legal opinion is
regularly sought from the EU Council legal Service before decisions are taken. In some
ways this is a relic of the EU’s original function as effectively a supra national legislature
where the major output were EU Directives which would then be implemented into the
legislation of the Member States.
The result is that, one organisation operates on a basis akin to English common law i.e.
through precedent and practical interpretation, while the other operates as though bound
by the continental Civil Code where everything that is not specifically allowed is illegal.
Unfortunately the overall impression left is that the European Union remains a more
exclusive organisation rather than the openly stated “inclusive” arrangements that exist in
NATO.
The role for NATO in the aftermath to the attacks on WTC and the Pentagon
If the fall of the Berlin Wall was the defining act of the end of the Cold War then surely
the Al Qaeda attack in New York and Washington on September 11 was one of the key
defining acts of the modern era.
The trends as with most defining moments in history had been apparent for some time,
state sponsored terrorism crossing international boundaries goes back over 30 years.
Islamic fundamentalism, or perhaps more correctly radicalism, has been a force in world
politics for almost as long. The concept of Rogue States is well established, if not
universally accepted. The fact that the attacks were followed by widespread speculation
about the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by terrorists only echoed the
deepest fears of some policy makers. Even Hollywood has explored this theme in its
disaster movies.
However what was abundantly apparent in the immediate aftermath of the attacks was
that while The International Community had recognised the emerging problem (the
various risks to transatlantic security are clearly identified in NATO’s 1991 Strategic
Concept) it had not put in place an effective mechanism, still less articulated an agreed
policy to deal with the problem.
The campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda has been pursued as a classic ad hoc
coalition of nations formed to deal with a specific crisis as for example in the 1991 Gulf War.
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This can be explained in that the United States and her allies, have front line experience
in counter terrorism, counter proliferation and the war on drugs. They are also amongst the
states that have the best-developed mechanisms and capabilities to identify, track and
interdict terrorism.
The clear advantage of such a campaign is that agreeing the military strategy amongst
relatively few nations is greatly simplified. The disadvantage is that the task of maintaining
political consensus at international level is at once more difficult and in long term more
time consuming and manpower intensive. A glance at the diaries of the senior US policy
makers would serve to show at a glance how much high level time and effort is being
expended on this one policy issue.
Most nations are prepared to adopt such a policy stance at times of war and that indeed
is the term that President Bush has used to describe the campaign. However he has also
said that it will be a long drawn out affair.
In the early stages of the campaign the US Administration also referred to “a Grand
Coalition” something much broader, more proactive and holistic an approach than “Fortress
America”. This may be the shape of the future. If so it would represent a profound change
in the way nations and International Organisations do business.
However, for the majority of nations, and for many of our International Organisations,
whose decision makers and opinion formers still carry much Cold War baggage, this is a
very confusing and uncertain time. As Nicole Gnesotto and Philip Gordon have described21
it is easy enough to fall back on stereotypes and accuse America of being “a unilateralist
superpower which acts alone and sees only military solutions to world problems”.
When NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington treaty following the 11 September
attacks some thought this meant that NATO might take a leading role in the campaign.
Clearly this did not occur but the decision was nevertheless a landmark event, not only
because Article 5 had never been invoked before, but also because it demonstrated a
move towards NATO taking on the kind of political role that the Strategic Concepts
envisage. The invocation of Article 5 was an extremely important political signal of
solidarity and one which was appreciated and welcomed by the American public and
media.
It was subsequently revealed in the press that NATO military planning was in fact
initiated by the military arm of NATO, not for an offensive operation since it was clear that
the United States wished to pursue the campaign using its own national resources, but for
21 International Herald Tribune, 13 March 2002.
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a NATO humanitarian airlift to support the international aid agencies in their efforts to
supply aid to Afghan refugees, both inside and outside the country.
As we now know, the plan was not put into effect. The use of military assets in such
a task is very much a last resort, both for reasons of cost and as a general rule the
international aid community prefers to use civil assets if at all possible.
However the very fact that NATO was prepared to countenance such an operation is
significant, particularly after the years of internal wrangling among the allies over where
NATO geographic responsibilities lay, the so called “Out of Area” debate. In an increasingly
globalised world it is unrealistic to argue that transatlantic security cannot be deeply
affected by events outside NATO’s traditional borders.
That is not to say that NATO will on its own be the best or even the most appropriate
instrument to use in every emerging crisis, or that the organisation is likely to develop a
“global reach”. It is also clear that at the time of writing the major players in the war against
terrorism still appear reluctant to constrain their national policy options by involving the
major international organisations.
Even if bilateral or multilateral coordination between nations is likely to remain the
principle driving force behind the campaign against international terrorism, in the longer
term, it is very much in the long term interests of the United States and her allies to ensure
that the campaign against international terrorism continues to enjoy widespread
international support and that the burden of combating this threat to world order is shared
amongst other members of the international community. The current major players will
need to encourage other nations to build their own capabilities to meet the terrorist threat
and to ensure that these capabilities complement their own.
The main medium term and long-term policy objectives could be summarised as
follows – to maintain the political consensus for the campaign – to separate moderate
opinion from the extremists – to deny terrorist groups safe havens and resources, both
material and financial – to develop new, and refine existing, national and international
capabilities to meet the threat, specifically the capability to identify and track terrorists and
to interdict their activities – and in the longer term to establish an environment22 where
international terrorism is effectively monitored, controlled and ultimately eliminated.
There is little appetite for creating new costly international organisations. So achieving
these objectives will require coordination of, diplomatic, military, economic and media
policy and amongst the political elites (parties) in a way that has rarely been done before.
22 Including an effective legal (UN and EU) framework for counter terrorist action.
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Such a holistic approach, where a variety of international organisations each have their
part to play, mirrors what a modern commercial company would recognise as a project
team or task force approach.
For such an approach to work requires the International Organisations and the nations
themselves to have a clear view where their strengths lie, what each is trying to achieve and
where they need to bring in, or develop links with, other organisations to ensure that the
overall policy is coherent.
The G7/8 has been mentioned as a possible leading player and has the advantage of
grouping together powerful and likeminded nations and covering both economic and
political issues. It perhaps has the potential to act in the same way as the Contact Group
has done in the Balkans, but with a much greater geographical scope. However, given its
limited membership other International Organisations will have roles to play in providing
strategic consensus and as force multipliers in action against the terrorist threat, as well as
in dealing with its consequences.
The UN has an essential role to play in providing overall legitimacy for action, also a
means to build up and maintain the widest geographic scope for political consensus. The
UN Agencies (together with the EU, OSCE and NGOs) will continue to play an important
role in alleviating the effects of world crises and underdevelopment, and thus addressing
some of the root causes of terrorism, i.e. political and economic disenfranchisement.
The International Financial Institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc) also have a key role to
play in this task. Although they have a traditional antipathy to policies where political
criteria have a greater bearing than the purely economic and hence they have often argued
against. Conditionality, the current shift away from infrastructure towards social projects
may mean they are able to complement the role played by UN, EU etc in tackling the root
causes of terrorism.
It is questionable whether the European Union’s CFSP or ESDP bodies are sufficiently
developed to take on a major new area of work effectively, particularly in any operational
context. The EU has serious constraints in discussing within its formal structures any
highly classified issues (which by necessity must underpin any attempt to track down
terrorist movements).
However the EU has, a major role to play in building consensus and the essential
framework for non military aspects of interdiction; for example in the areas of extradition
arrangements, harmonising border controls, anti terrorist legislation, domestic security
measures etc. The EU also has a key role in building consensus for economic sanctions and
their implementation.
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NATO is the natural forum for Europe and North America to discuss the security and
defence aspects of the anti-terrorism agenda. As such NATO could play a key role in
creating the hard-core of political consensus, which allies can then pursue in other fora.
NATO also benefits from an existing Politico/Military infrastructure with room to
adapt, including an existing security/intelligence architecture. Past experience suggests
that developing NATO as an intelligence-gathering instrument may be difficult, but there
are ways NATO can be used as a mechanism for sharing assessments rather than exchanging
raw data, which most allies do not have the background information to analyse. The
experience gained in NATO in its work with other international agencies to tackling the
problem of organised crime in Balkans may show the way forward.
NATO also has the potential to become the main forum for developing the military
response to terrorism by encouraging other nations to develop capabilities to identify,
track and interdict international terrorism
The NATO Outreach programme (via both EAPC and PJC) and Mediterranean Dialo-
gue could be used to help non-NATO states buy-in to NATO anti-terrorism doctrine and
to develop similar capabilities and links with allies capabilities. President Putin’s apparent
willingness to work with NATO opens up new possibilities. However, if NATO is to fulfil
this potential it will need to improve its links with other organisations something that it has
traditionally been reluctant to do.
The final model as far as NATO is concerned may be close to the mechanism adopted
to deal with the problem of apprehending war criminals from the Bosnian conflict or more
correctly, Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWCs). In this little known area of policy,
consensus for action against certain individuals is separated from the action itself, which
is carried out by a smaller group of nations on behalf of the others.
Thus in the field of counter terrorism, there would need to be a strategic level
consensus in a broad range of International Organisations, including NATO, that country
X or organisation Y is a concern from an international anti-terrorism perspective. This
would allow a range of both sanctions and other measures to bear aimed at removing the
causes of terrorism. Below that level there might be agreement on a classified list of
individuals or organisations linked to terrorism within that country or organisation. As
with PIFWCs, action against those individuals/organisations would be the prerogative of
the nations with the capability to take such action.
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Conclusions
The enlargement debate brings into sharp relief the many questions surrounding
NATO’s future role. In essence what type of organisation is the NATO of the 21st century.
If NATO is still essentially a military alliance for collective defence, then perhaps the
key question centres on whether the existing allies, and in particular the nuclear weapon
states, are prepared to extend a collective security guarantee to the applicant nation and
in the last analysis put its own national survival at risk to defend that nation.
If on the other hand NATO has become a major crisis management organisation where
projecting and maintaining security is the key task, then the major determinant is whether
the addition of new members will still allow the organisation to function effectively and
whether the new members are able to contribute effectively to the tasks and challenges
facing the organisation.
Either way, pressure to enlarge is unlike to reduce, as Fukayama observed, individuals
and nation states have for the most part a strong motivation for recognition and respect.
Membership of NATO remains a sought after “badge of office”.
The events of 11 September showed that the analysis of NATO’s strategic Concept was
essentially correct. The threats that the majority of nation states that make up the Atlantic
community are most likely to face are not invasion and the overthrow of the state by
military means. Only a relative few applicant countries seek NATO membership for this
reason.
The significant threats to nation states in the developed world are threats to states’
internal security and to their external security interests. The Al Qaeda attacks showed that
such threats can involve extreme levels of violence and high loss of life. Everyone is
conscious that Weapons of Mass Destruction could produce much greater levels of
destruction and causalities, but this is not likely to lead to the overthrow of the State and
the subjugation of the entire population.
The Strategic Concepts sketched out a radical new agenda for NATO, and it is perhaps
too easy to be critical of NATO for falling short of its ambitions. Change is costly and
threatening perhaps no more so than in the field of military affairs. It is worth recalling that
the catchwords of the early 90s were the “Peace Dividend” and “Downsizing”.
In fact the experience of NATO operations in the Balkans has shown the Alliance to
have been remarkably effective in adapting its military arm to meet the new crisis
management and security tasks. The network of relationships established under
Partnership for Peace allow for a degree of flexibility and interoperability with non-allies
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that could scarcely be imagined a decade ago. NATO planners have shown the ability
to plan effectively for operations far beyond the traditional geographic limits of the
Alliance.
The challenge on the military side now lies with the nations rather than NATO itself.
Agreement to further streamlining NATO’s regional commands has been mooted by the
NATO military before. The funds saved could be better spent on developing the High
Readiness forces that NATO needs and uses.
Too many nations have yet to reconfigure their armed forces away from the task of
territorial defence, where if required the whole population can be mobilised, and towards
expeditionary operations. As a result many key national military resources are blocked in
reserve formations that are difficult to deploy for crisis management operations. The ESDP
is in part an attempt to overcome this problem and as such is a welcome development. It
is complementary to NATO’s own Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which underlines
the fact that for many allies defence spending still remains below target.
The real challenge for NATO as an organisation probably lies more in the adaptation
of its civil and politico/diplomatic side and its ability to develop links with other
organisations.
The real world example I have given of NATO’s role in the 2001 crisis in FYROM may
offer some pointers on the way forward, in particular the need to develop the role of the
Secretary General so that he is able to act under his own authority to allow a stronger
NATO voice in international political affairs; in a process where the Secretary General
would inform the NATO Council, but not seek (or be given) formal guidance. In so doing,
The Secretary General can serve, not only as the voice of the Alliance leaders, but on
occasions as their conscience.
Such changes will need practical underpinnings, in particular the ability to deploy
civilian negotiators to work alongside other International Organisations in defusing
an emerging crisis. For example, in many organisations the post of Political Director
has been created to act below the level of Secretary General on purely policy issues
and to provide the key contact point for outside contacts. NATO currently has no such
post.
During the Cold War the NATO committee structure was designed for a slow moving
bureaucratic task. Today’s NATO has to produce decisions and guidance to its military
commanders often in a fast moving environment.
All the above suggests the time is right for a review of the internal structures of the
organisation in Brussels.
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As I have argued earlier there is also a strong case for further reducing the civil/
/military divisions in the current committee structures and by extension their supporting
international staffs.
The threat of international terrorism and asymmetric warfare, brought into sharp relief
by the events of 11 September presents a huge challenge to NATO, but also opportunities.
Some would argue that NATO’s greatest service after 11 September has been in
providing discipline to hold the US and the Europeans (and indeed, now also Russia)
together against common “new“ threats, while allowing the American “sole superpower”
to be exposed to the views of its friends and allies.
There has always been an anti-NATO lobby within parts of the American society.
Those who argue against any constraints on US policy (and who see the chimera of
European caucusing at the core of the ESDP debate). One can hope that, as in the past, wiser
counsels will prevail; those who recognise that a more political NATO need not be a recipe
for weakness, but actually a more effective means of maintaining western solidarity, and
an essential element in successful security action elsewhere.
In adapting to the challenges of the modern era, the “Old NATO”, dominated by the
United States has given way to a more complex set of relationships. The “New NATO” is
no longer simply the means to provide the US with a bulwark against Soviet expansion, but
one of the key instruments for promoting stability. At a time of increasing interdependence,
(when for example just under ten percent of US Jobs depended on European investment)
the importance of ensuring international organisations such as NATO are effective should
be self-evident.
As I have argued NATO is well placed to play a leading role in key aspects of the
campaign against the new menace of international terrorism. Russia and other non-allies
seem ready to use NATO, but NATO still has to prove that it has the flexibility to adapt
its decision making procedures to this and the other new tasks, to make the best use of the
unique variable geometry established as part of its Outreach programme and thus to bring
in the widest possible participation.
This year NATO leaders will have the opportunity at the Rome and Prague Summits
to set out their agenda for the “new” NATO. But as always the real test will lie in how the
organisation itself implements those decisions. Past experience suggests that NATO can
and will rise to the challenge.
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